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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Bald Eagle Area School District and South Butler County 
School District filed a putative class action complaint 
asserting, inter alia, four claims against Keystone Financial, 
Inc., Mid-State Bank & Trust Co., and certain named 
individuals under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt 
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U. S. C. S 1962, by which 
they sought to recover approximately $70 million that they 
lost as a result of a Ponzi scheme. The District Court, 
concluded that S 107 of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") amended RICO so as to 
preclude the School Districts' civil RICO action, and 
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dismissed the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Various school districts, municipalities and other 
governmental units were purported victims of a Ponzi  
scheme1 run by John Gardner Black through his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Ponzi schemes take their name from Charles Ponzi. Following the 
collapse of his fraudulent investment scheme, a number of investors 
began lawsuits to recover their investments. Some litigation ultimately 
reached the Supreme Court, which described the operation of Ponzi's 
fraudulent investment scheme. 
 
       The litigation grows out of the remarkable criminal career of 
Charles 
       Ponzi. In December, 1919, with a capital of $150, he began the 
       business of borrowing money on his promissory notes. He did not 
       profess to receive money for investment for account of the lender. 
He 
       borrowed the money on his credit only. He spread the false tale 
that 
       on his own account he was engaged in buying international postal 
       coupons in foreign countries and selling them in other countries at 
       100% profit, and that this was made possible by the excessive 
       differences in the rates of exchange following the war. He was 
       willing, he said, to give others the opportunity to share with him 
this 
       profit. By a written promise in 90 days to pay them $150 for every 
       $100 loaned, he induced thousands to lend him. He stimulated their 
       avidity by paying his 90-day notes in full at the end of 45 days, 
and 
       by circulating the notice that he would pay any unmatured note 
       presented in less than 45 days at 100% of the loan. Within eight 
       months he took in $9,582,000, for which he issued his notes for 
       $14,374,000. He paid his agents a commission of 10%. With the 
       50%. promised to lenders, every loan paid in full with the profit 
       would cost him 60%. He was always insolvent, and became daily 
       more so, the more his business succeeded. He made no investments 
       of any kind, so that all the money he had at any time was solely 
the 
       result of loans by his dupes. 
 
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1924). Nowadays, "[a] `Ponzi' 
scheme is a term generally used to describe an investment scheme 
which is not really supported by any underlying business venture. The 
investors are paid profits from the principal sums paid in by newly 
attracted investors. Usually those who invest in the scheme are promised 
large returns on their principal investments. The initial investors are 
indeed paid the sizable promised returns. This attracts additional 
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companies: Devon Capital Management2 ("Devon") and 
Financial Management Services, Inc.3 ("FMS") (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Devon."). The various local 
government units appointed Devon to act as their 
investment advisor for the proceeds of bonds, loans and 
other revenues. On September 26, 1997, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission obtained a freeze of all assets under 
the control of Devon. The original SEC action has been 
closed and a number of the investors have received only a 
small fraction of their original investments. Certain of the 
investors then began an involuntary bankruptcy action 
against Black, Devon and FMS and that action has halted 
any other litigation in which Black, Devon and FMS were 
named as defendants. 
 
Bald Eagle Area School District and South Butler County 
School District (hereinafter "School Districts") were among 
Black's clients. From 1990 to 1997, they retained Devon as 
their investment advisor for the investment of proceeds 
from bonds sold to finance school construction. The School 
Districts entered into a series of Investment Advisory 
Agreements with Devon pursuant to which Devon would 
invest bond proceeds on their behalf and distribute funds 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
investors. More and more investors need to be attracted into the scheme 
so that the growing number of investors on top can get paid. The person 
who runs this scheme typically uses some of the money invested for 
personal use. Usually, this pyramid collapses and most investors not 
only do not get paid their profits, but also lose their principal 
investments." Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of 
Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 Am. Bankr. L. J. 157, 158 
(1998). 
 
2. Devon was a Maryland corporation started by Black in 1989, with its 
principal place of business in Tyrone, Pennsylvania. Devon was 
registered with the SEC as an investment advisor. It was not registered 
with the SEC as a broker or dealer of securities. Complaint at P 23. 
Black was the president, portfolio manager and sole shareholder of 
Devon. SEC v. Black, 163 F.3d 188, 191 n.1 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
3. FMS was formed by Black in 1992 and began operations in 1993. It 
was not registered as an investment advisor or broker or dealer of 
securities. Its principal place of business was also in Tyrone, 
Pennsylvania. Complaint at P 24. Black is the sole owner of FMS, which 
is a Pennsylvania corporation. SEC v. Black, 163 F.3d at 191 n.1. 
 
                                4 
  
as they were needed to pay construction costs. The 
Investment Advisory Agreements gave Devon discretion to 
invest in securities authorized by law but provided that 
Devon would not take possession of, or act as custodian 
for, the cash, securities or other assets of the School 
Districts. Instead, the Investment Advisory Agreements 
provided for Devon's appointment of a custodian for the 
accounts in which the School Districts' assets were held. 
Pursuant to the Investment Advisory Agreements, Devon 
entered into a Custodian Agreement with Mid-State Bank & 
Trust Co. Under the Custodian Agreement, Mid-State was 
to maintain custody of the School Districts' assets, which 
were at all times to be 100% secured by collateral. Chief 
among Mid-States' duties under the Custodian Agreement 
was implementation of securities investment decisions 
made by Devon as the School Districts' investment advisor. 
Essentially, Mid-State acted as the intermediary which 
processed the securities trades that were directed by 
Devon. Its specific obligations under the Custodian 
Agreement included receiving funds for investment from 
Devon's clients, executing securities transactions with these 
funds based on instructions from Devon, executing further 
purchases and sales of securities held in the custodial 
accounts based on instructions from Devon; collecting and 
crediting all payments received on the securities, including 
dividends, interest, or principal payments; and providing 
monthly account statements of the assets held in each 
custodial account. 
 
From 1990 through 1993, the relationship between 
Devon and the School Districts was lucrative. However, 
starting in 1993, in response to competitive pressures in 
the marketplace, Devon sought ways to get a better return 
on the funds entrusted to it. One way Devon attempted to 
earn better returns was by purchasing riskier investments, 
including volatile derivative securities. 
 
To facilitate the purchase of the riskier investments, 
Devon directed Mid-State beginning in mid-1994 to invest 
a portion of the clients' funds in Collateralized Investment 
Agreements ("CIAs") issued by FMS.4  The CIAs had varying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. FMS and Mid-State entered into a Custodian Agreement on May 10, 
1993, pursuant to which Mid-State agreed to perform custodian and 
other duties similar to those created by the Custodian Agreement 
between Devon and Mid-State. 
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fixed income returns, but they all required that FMS 
maintain collateral equal to 100% of the principal amount 
invested. Each CIA had a fixed maturity date and a demand 
element permitting the School Districts to request 
repayment before the maturity date. FMS pooled the funds 
from the sale of the CIAs, invested them in risky securities 
and used those securities as collateral for the CIAs. 
 
Pursuant to Devon's instructions, Mid-State sold 
securities in Devon's client accounts and purchased CIAs 
issued by FMS. Following the placement of the CIAs in 
client accounts, Mid-State continued to provide monthly 
account statements for Devon clients as required by the 
Custodian Agreement. The statements reported the 
transactions in the accounts, including deposits, 
withdrawals and interest earned. The CIAs were reported in 
the statements as cash equivalents with current value 
equal to the principal amount owed by FMS. 
 
However, FMS began to suffer large trading losses in the 
risky derivative investments in its collateral account. Other 
losses resulted from Black's misuse of assets held as CIA 
collateral and his transfer of CIA collateral to other Devon 
advisory clients for less than full value. By early 1995, the 
collateral in the FMS accounts was approximately $56 
million less than FMS' liabilities under the CIAs. 
Nevertheless, pursuant to Devon's instructions, FMS 
continued to sell and repurchase its CIAs at face value. 
Consequently, Devon permitted its clients to redeem their 
CIAs at full price even though the value of the underlying 
collateral had plummeted, while at the same time Devon 
(through instructions to Mid-State) helped fund these 
redemptions with new sales of CIAs at full face value. In the 
aggregate, between June 1994 and September 1997, Mid- 
State, at Devon's direction, purchased and sold hundreds of 
millions of dollars of CIAs for the account of Devon clients 
for whom Mid-State had custodial accounts. These 
transactions were all for the face value of the CIAs 
regardless of the value of the securities in FMS' CIA 
collateral accounts. The purchases and sales between FMS 
and Devon's clients continued until the SEC revealed on 
September 26, 1997, that the Devon CIA investment 
program was a securities fraud. 
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Thereafter, the SEC commenced a civil action against 
Black, Devon and FMS alleging that they had perpetrated a 
massive Ponzi scheme through the purchase and sale of the 
CIA securities in violation of S 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rule 10b-5, and other 
provisions of federal securities law. The SEC alleged that 
Devon continued to accept new funds from investment 
advisory clients for purchases of CIAs without disclosing 
that, as a result of the shortfall in the collateral for the 
funds already invested in those securities, any new funds 
invested would immediately diminish in value by as much 
as 45 percent. The SEC further alleged that the Devon 
advisory clients who had invested in the CIA program had 
suffered a combined loss of their principal investment of 
approximately $71 million. On December 12, 1997, the 
District Court issued an injunction against Black, Devon 
and FMS barring future violations of securities law 
including S 10(b), and Rule 10b-5. 
 
II. 
 
On May 27, 1998, the School Districts filed this putative 
class action asserting four RICO claims, and seeking to 
recover the $70 million lost as a result of the Ponzi scheme. 
Counts 1 through 3 assert claims for violations of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1962(c).5 The predicate acts are alleged to consist of wire, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. 18 U.S.C. S 1962 provides: 
 
       (a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income 
       derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering 
activity 
       or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has 
       participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 
18, 
       United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any 
part 
       of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of 
       any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any 
enterprise 
       which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate 
or 
       foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for 
       purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or 
       participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another 
to 
       do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the 
securities 
       of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate 
       family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering 
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mail and bank fraud. Count 4 asserts a claim for 
conspiracy to violate S 1962(c). In addition, the complaint 
asserts six state law claims. The complaint named Mid- 
State, Keystone Financial, Inc., (Mid-State's corporate 
parent); William H. Bogel, Senior VP and Director of Trust 
Department at Mid-State; Nancy F. Fogel, VP, Trust Officer 
and Head of Operations for Mid-State; Robert Leech, 
Director of Trust Services for Keystone; and Robert R. 
Magill, VP and Head of Trust Operations for Keystone 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Mid-State") as 
defendants.6 
 
The Ponzi scheme is the foundation of this complaint. 
The School Districts allege that Mid-State knowingly 
participated in, and furthered, the Ponzi scheme through 
numerous acts of mail, wire and bank fraud. The School 
Districts' theory is that Mid-State's role in the Ponzi scheme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase 
do 
       not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding 
       securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in 
       fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer. 
 
       (b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
       racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to 
       acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or 
control 
       of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which 
       affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 
 
       (c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated 
       with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
       interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly 
or 
       indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a 
       pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
 
       (d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any 
of 
       the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
 
6. As noted, Keystone is Mid-State's corporate parent. Keystone, through 
its division known as Keystone Financial Trust Operations ("KFTO") 
maintained central trust accounting functions for Mid-State and other 
Keystone subsidiaries. Among other things, KFTO processed and 
accounted for trades, and posted income and other transactions for Mid- 
State, Devon and FMS. KFTO also prepared and printed account 
statements for the trust and custodian accounts of its subsidiaries, 
including Mid-State. 
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was essential to the scheme's existence and continuation. 
Mid-State accepted deposits into custodian accounts and 
those funds were exchanged for CIAs, by which FMS 
promised to repay the funds with earnings. Bald Eagle and 
South Butler allege not only that Mid-State acted as a 
"back office" for Devon and FMS, but also that the Ponzi 
scheme could not have operated without Mid-State's 
participation. That argument is based upon the assertion 
that the putative class members' funds could be held only 
in custodian accounts and had to be fully secured. 
Plaintiffs also allege that although Mid-State was well aware 
of the shortfalls in the FMS collateral accounts, Mid-State 
seized upon the volatility of the investments as a means of 
recovering the losses in hope of limiting its own liability. 
Plaintiffs further allege that, at the same time, Mid-State 
took affirmative steps to conceal the scheme by knowingly 
preparing trust statements which falsely inflated the 
market values of the investments despite knowing that the 
collateral was grossly insufficient. The School Districts 
contend that whenever funds were requested by Devon 
clients, Mid-State paid out the full amount requested even 
though there was insufficient collateral to pay all putative 
class members and other clients. 
 
The School Districts also allege that Mid-State gave a 
false explanation to the FDIC and other bank regulators to 
explain the collateral shortfall, and that Mid-State received 
a cash flow projection from Black which indicated that FMS 
would be in full balance by November of 1998. However, 
according to plaintiffs, Mid-State knew that Black's 
projection required, among other things, the receipt of an 
additional $330 million of custodian funds between March 
1996 and November 1998 -- i.e., Mid-State knew that in 
order for FMS to be in full balance as projected by Black, 
the Ponzi scheme needed to be continued. 
 
On August 10, 1998, Mid-State moved to dismiss the 
School Districts' civil RICO claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) 
and 12(b)(6). Mid-State asserted that (1) the civil RICO 
action was barred by S 107 of the PSLRA; (2) the complaint 
was not supported by adequate averments of fraud as 
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); (3) the alleged predicate 
acts were not the proximate cause of the School Districts' 
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injuries; and (4) the complaint failed to satisfy other 
required elements for civil RICO claims. On February 9, 
1999, the District Court held that S 107 of the PSLRA 
barred the School Districts' civil RICO claims, and granted 
Mid-State's motion to dismiss. The court did not discuss 
the other grounds for dismissal advanced by Mid-State, and 
the District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the School Districts' state law claims. This 
appeal followed.7 
 
III. 
 
Prior to 1995, a private plaintiff could assert a civil RICO 
claim for securities law violations sounding in "garden 
variety" fraud.. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 
U. S. 479, 504-505 (1985)(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Inasmuch as "fraud in the sale of securities" was a 
predicate offense in both criminal and civil RICO actions, 
Id. at 504, plaintiffs regularly elevated fraud to RICO 
violations because RICO offered the potential bonanza of 
recovering treble damages. However, in 1995, Congress 
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
("PSLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). The 
PSLRA amended RICO by narrowing the kind of conduct 
that could qualify as a predicate act. Section 107 of the 
PSLRA (known as the "RICO Amendment") amended 18 
U.S.C. S 1964(c), to provide in relevant part as follows: 
 
       Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
       violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any 
       appropriate United States District Court and shall recover 
threefold 
       the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a 
       reasonable attorney's fee, except that no person may rely upon any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "Whether the District Court properly dismissed the . . . complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a RICO 
claim is subject to plenary review, and we apply the same standard as 
the District Court. We construe the complaint liberally and take all 
material allegations as admitted. All reasonable inferences are drawn in 
favor of the plaintiffs. We will not affirm the dismissal unless the 
plaintiffs could prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief." 
University of Maryland at Baltimore v. Peak, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 
F.2d 1534, 1537-38 (3d Cir. 1993)(citations omitted). 
 
                                10 
  
       conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or 
       sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1964(c)(emphasis added). 
 
The Conference Committee Report accompanying S 107 
states that the amendment was intended not simply"to 
eliminate securities fraud as a predicate offense in a civil 
RICO action," but also to prevent a plaintiff from "plead[ing] 
other specified offenses, such as mail or wire fraud, as 
predicate acts under civil RICO if such offenses are based 
on conduct that would have been actionable as securities 
fraud." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 47 (1995). 
 
We recently held that S 107 eliminated "any conduct 
actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities" as 
a predicate act for a private cause of action under RICO. 
Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 161 F.3d 156, 157 
(3d Cir. 1998).8 We stated that the legislative history shows 
that Congress enacted the RICO Amendment "to address a 
significant number of frivolous actions based on alleged 
securities law violations." Id. at 164 (quoting 141 Cong. 
Rec. H2771 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995)(statement of Rep. Cox)). 
The "focus" of the Amendment was on "completely 
eliminating the so-called `treble damage blunderbuss of 
RICO' in securities fraud cases." Id. (quoting 141 Cong. 
Rec. H2771). 
 
Here, careful examination of the School Districts' 
complaint discloses the District Court correctly concluded 
that the School Districts' Civil RICO Action is barred by 
S 107. In the SEC's civil action against Black, Devon and 
FMS, the SEC has alleged that a massive Ponzi scheme was 
perpetrated through the purchase and sale of CIAs in 
violation of the securities laws including S 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC Rule 10b-5 and 
other provisions of the securities law. SEC Complaint, App. 
at 523-39. That same Ponzi scheme is at the heart of this 
RICO action. Plaintiff's allegations include the following: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In Mathews, we held that the RICO Amendment does not apply 
retrospectively, i.e., "it does not apply to cases pending at the time the 
[PSLRA] was enacted." 161 F.3d at 171. 
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       P 3. Bald Eagle and South Butler bring this class 
       action under . . . [RICO] . . . to recover their losses 
       caused by [Mid-States'] participation in an elaborate, 
       but carefully concealed municipal fraud of immense 
       magnitude, that ultimately became nothing more than 
       an old-fashioned Ponzi Scheme. . . . 
 
       P 4. The Ponzi scheme was revealed publicly on 
       September 26, 1997, when the Securities and 
       Exchange Commission ("SEC") commenced a civil 
       enforcement action . . . against . . . [Black, Devon and 
       FMS] . . . . As detailed in the SEC's enforcement action, 
       Black illegally perpetrated such a scheme upon . . . 
       [the School Districts and other class members] . . . 
       causing them to lose approximately $70,000,000. 
       However, Black could not conduct this scheme alone, 
       and, in fact, [Mid-State] joined and participated in such 
       scheme through multiple acts of bank, mail and wire 
       fraud, . . . . 
 
Plaintiffs allege that Mid-State joined, assisted and 
participated in Black's Ponzi scheme: 
 
       P 5. [A]lthough Black's Ponzi scheme wasfirst revealed 
       publicly in September 1997, [Mid-State] discovered it 
       years before the SEC uncovered it. Rather than reveal 
       the scheme, and put a stop to it, however, [Mid-State] 
       joined in the scheme and enabled it to continue in the 
       hope that Black could recover his massive losses and, 
       more importantly, thereby avoid any claims against 
       [Mid-State](emphasis in original) . . . . 
 
       P 94. [Mid-State] ignored [its] obligations to class 
       members because [it] became embroiled in, and 
       participated in, a Ponzi scheme that depended upon 
       the unauthorized pooling of class members' funds, the 
       investment of those funds in risky, impermissible 
       investment, the fraudulent reporting of market values, 
       and the infusion of more money to keep the scheme 
       going. . . . 
 
       P 95. [B]ecause neither Devon nor FMS were licensed 
       as a broker or dealer in securities, Black used Mid- 
       State . . . as the "back office" for Devon. In this 
       capacity, Mid-State . . . essentially acted as the 
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       intermediar[y] which processed the securities trades 
       that were directed by Black. . . . 
 
       P 126. [Mid-State], whose role[ ], inter alia, custodian 
       and "back office," [was] essential to Black's Ponzi 
       scheme, had by now knowingly joined the scheme as 
       participant[ ]. . . . 
 
       P 133. Because bond proceeds and certain other funds 
       of school districts and other governmental units can 
       only be deposited with custodian banks, such as[Mid- 
       State], it was impossible for Black to continue his Ponzi 
       scheme, once disclosed and fully understood, without 
       the knowing participation and assistance of [Mid- 
       State]. Rather than stop this fraud, however, and 
       fearing that [Mid-State] would be liable for tens of 
       millions of dollars of past losses, and that individual 
       Defendants' jobs and careers were in jeopardy, [Mid- 
       State] elected not to reveal the Ponzi scheme, but 
       rather, to join, assist, and continue it. 
 
These few excerpts demonstrate, in the School Districts' 
own words, that Mid-State's "role in the Ponzi scheme was 
essential to its existence and continuation." Appellants' Br. 
at 8. The School Districts allege that Black's Ponzi scheme 
was securities fraud. We, like the District Court, must 
accept these allegations as true for purposes of a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)9 University of Maryland v. Peak, 
Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1537-38 (3d Cir. 
1993). Therefore, the alleged conduct is "conduct that 
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase and 
sale of securities," S 107 PSLRA, and it cannot constitute 
predicate acts of a RICO violation. Accordingly, it is clear 
that the RICO action is barred by S 107. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In its opinion, the District Court, while reciting that Mid-State had 
filed a motion to dismiss, recited the standards for granting summary 
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. However, it is clear from reading the 
opinion that the District Court was conducting a 12(b)(6) analysis. 
Further, the parties to this appeal acknowledge that it was a 12(b)(6) 
motion. See, e.g., Mid-States' Br. at 5 n.1 ("For purposes of this appeal 
appellees accept the allegations in the complaint as true but do not 
otherwise concede their accuracy."). 
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The School Districts attempt to avoid the unavoidable by 
arguing here, as they did before the District Court, that the 
challenged conduct "does constitute bank fraud, wire fraud 
and mail fraud, but does not constitute securities fraud." 
Appellants' Br. at 11-12 (emphasis in original). However, 
they also concede that some of the conduct alleged as 
predicate offenses of mail, wire, and bank fraud does 
constitute securities fraud. See Reply Br. at 28 ("The 
District Court correctly stated that `the issue before me 
appears to be whether the RICO amendment bars an action 
where only some of the predicate acts would have been 
actionable as [securities] fraud.") Plaintiffs assert that if 
only some of the conduct alleged is securities fraud, then 
"obviously some other portion of [Mid-State's] conduct is 
not actionable as securities fraud." Id. And, it is this "other 
portion" of Mid-State's conduct which the School Districts 
argue constitutes the predicate offenses of mail, wire and 
bank fraud. 
 
The School Districts submit that the "other portion" of 
the conduct consists of "obtaining deposits of funds, failing 
to maintain collateral, failing to maintain custody of funds, 
paying out more funds to withdrawing clients than the fair 
value of their account, providing false trust statements 
(after deposits are obtained), and lying to bank regulators." 
School Districts' Br. At 12 (emphasis in original). 
 
The School Districts' position ignores two significant and 
intertwined facts. First, as noted earlier, the RICO 
Amendment removed securities fraud as a predicate offense 
in a civil RICO action. Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), 10 and SEC Rule 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Section 10(b) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange -- 
 
       ****************************** 
 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors." 
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10b-5, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5,11 are directed at fraud "in 
connection with the purchase or sale" of securities. Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 
(1975) (emphasis added). The School Districts' position 
ignores the reality that the same set of facts can support 
convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and 
securities fraud without giving rise to any multiplicity 
problems. See United States v. Faulhaber, 929 F.2d 16 (1st 
Cir. 1991) and United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 
1981). Each of those offenses requires proof of a fact which 
the others do not. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. 
S. 299 (1932). Consequently, a plaintiff cannot avoid the 
RICO Amendment's bar by pleading mail fraud, wire fraud 
and bank fraud as predicate offenses in a civil RICO action 
if the conduct giving rise to those predicate offenses 
amounts to securities fraud. Allowing such surgical 
presentation of the cause of action here would undermine 
the congressional intent behind the RICO Amendment. 
Second, the contention that the conduct alleged as 
predicate offenses was not in connection with the purchase 
or sale of securities completely ignores the hard reality that 
the conduct was an integral part of Black's securities fraud 
Ponzi scheme. A Ponzi scheme is ongoing, and it continues 
only so long as new investors can be lured into it so that 
the early investors can be paid a return on their 
"investment." Consequently, conduct undertaken to keep a 
securities fraud Ponzi scheme alive is conduct undertaken 
in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. For 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. SEC Rule 10b-5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, 
or 
 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security." 
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example, the CIAs purchased by the School Districts were 
worth significantly less than their purchase price because 
of the shortfall in the collateral in the funds already 
under management. However, it is alleged that Mid-State 
either misrepresented, or failed to disclose, the collateral 
shortfall in account statements it prepared. This 
misrepresentation/omission, induced new investments. 
Such conduct may well constitute wire, mail or bank fraud, 
but it was also undertaken in connection with the purchase 
of a security. Thus, it cannot support a civil RICO claim 
after enactment of the PSLRA. 
 
The District Court held that the RICO Amendment barred 
the School Districts' civil RICO action because the conduct 
underlying the RICO claims is "intrinsically connected to, 
and dependent upon conduct which would be actionable 
under Federal securities law." Dist. Ct. Op. at 13. But, the 
proper focus of the analysis is on whether the conduct pled 
as predicate offenses is "actionable" as securities fraud -- 
not on whether the conduct is "intrinsically connected to, 
and dependent upon" conduct actionable as securities 
fraud. Because the District Court appeared to center its 
attention on whether the conduct alleged as predicate 
offenses was connected to and dependent upon securities 
fraud, rather than on whether the conduct was actionable 
as securities fraud, the School Districts argue that the 
District Court gave an "overly expansive" reading to the 
RICO Amendment. Appellants' Br. at 11. However, on a 
close reading of the District Court's opinion, it is clear that 
the District Court's analysis was properly focused on 
whether the conduct was actionable as securities fraud. 
The tenor of the opinion demonstrates that the District 
Court found the conduct alleged as predicate acts was so 
closely connected to and dependent upon conduct 
undertaken in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities that it was actionable as securities fraud. 
Consequently, we find no merit in the School Districts' 
argument that the District Court's reading of the RICO 
Amendment was overly expansive. 
 
IV. 
 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the decision of the 
District Court. 
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